

Security Analysis of A Single Sign-On Mechanism for Distributed Computer Networks

Guilin Wang, Jiangshan Yu, and Qi Xie

Abstract—Single sign-on (SSO) is a new authentication mechanism that enables a legal user with a single credential to be authenticated by multiple service providers in a distributed computer network. Recently, Chang and Lee proposed a new SSO scheme and claimed its security by providing well-organized security arguments. In this paper, however, we demonstratively show that their scheme is actually insecure as it fails to meet credential privacy and soundness of authentication. Specifically, we present two impersonation attacks. The first attack allows a malicious service provider, who has successfully communicated with a legal user twice, to recover the user’s credential and then to impersonate the user to access resources and services offered by other service providers. In another attack an outsider without any credential may be able to enjoy network services freely by impersonating any legal user or a nonexistent user. We identify the flaws in their security arguments to explain why attacks are possible against their SSO scheme. Our attacks also applies to another SSO scheme proposed by Hsu and Chuang, which inspired the design of Chang-Lee scheme. Moreover, by employing an efficient verifiable encryption of RSA signatures proposed by Ateniese, we propose an improvement for repairing Chang-Lee scheme. We promote the formal study of the soundness of authentication as one open problem.

Keywords: Authentication, Single Sign-On, Security Analysis, Information Security, Distributed Computer Networks.

I. INTRODUCTION

With the wide spread use of distributed computer networks, it has become common to allow users to access various network services offered by distributed service providers [1], [2]. Consequently, user authentication (also called user identification) [3], [4] plays a crucial role in distributed computer networks to verify if a user is legal and can therefore be granted access to the services requested. To avoid bogus servers users usually need to authenticate service providers. After mutual authentication, a session key may be negotiated to keep the confidentiality of the data exchanged between a user and a service provider [4], [5]. In many scenarios, the anonymity of legal users must be protected as well [4], [6]. However, practice has shown that it is a big challenge to design efficient and secure authentication protocols with these security properties in complex computer network environments [7], [8].

In 2000, Lee and Chang [4] proposed a user identification and key distribution scheme to maintain user anonymity in

distributed computer networks. Later, Wu and Hsu [9] pointed out that the Lee-Chang scheme is insecure against both impersonation attacks and identity disclosure attacks. Meanwhile, Yang et al. [10] identified a weakness in the Wu-Hsu scheme and proposed an improvement. In 2006, however, Mangipudi and Katti [11] pointed out that Yang et al.’s scheme suffers from DoS (Deniable of Service) attacks and presented a new scheme. In 2009, Hsu and Chuang [12] showed that both Yang et al. and the Mangipudi-Katti schemes were insecure under identity disclosure attack, and proposed an RSA-based user identification scheme to overcome this weakness. Recently, authentication and privacy have been attracted a lot of attentions in RFID systems [13], [14], industrial networks [8], as well as general computer networks [15].

On the other side, it is usually not practical by asking one user to maintain distinct pairs of identity and passwords for different service providers, since this could increase the workload of both users and service providers as well as the communication overhead of networks. To tackle this problem, single sign-on (SSO) mechanism [16] has been introduced so that after obtaining a credential from a trusted authority for a short period (say one day), each legal user’s authentication agent can use this single credential to complete authentication on behalf of the user and then access multiple service providers. Intuitively, an SSO scheme should meet at least three basic security requirements, i.e., *unforgeability*, *credential privacy*, and *soundness*. Unforgeability demands that except the trusted authority, even a collusion of users and service providers are not able to forge a valid credential for a new user. Credential privacy guarantees that colluded dishonest service providers should not be able to fully recover a user’s credential and then impersonate the user to log in to other service providers. Soundness means that an unregistered user without a credential should not be able to access the services offered by service providers. Formal security definitions of unforgeability and credential privacy were given in [17].

A similar concept, called generalized digital certificate (GDC) was proposed in [18] to provide user authentication and key agreement in wireless networks, in which a user, who holds a digital signature of his/her GDC issued by an authority, can authenticate him/herself to a verifier by proving the knowledge of the signature without revealing it.

Chang and Lee [19] made a careful study of SSO mechanism. Firstly, they argued that the Hsu-Chuang user identification scheme, actually an SSO scheme, has two weaknesses: (a) an outsider can forge a valid credential by mounting a credential forging attack since the Hsu-Chang scheme employed naive RSA signature without using any hash function to issue

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a credential for any random identity selected by a user (In fact, this feature inherits from [10].); and (b) Hsu-Chuang scheme requires clock synchronization since it uses a time stamp. Then, Chang and Lee presented an interesting RSA-based SSO scheme, which does not rely on clock synchronization by using a nonce instead of a time stamp. Their scheme is suitable for mobile devices due to its high efficiency in computation and communication. Finally, they presented a well-organized security analysis to show that their SSO scheme supports secure mutual authentication, session key agreement, and user anonymity. In [17], Han et al. proposed a generic SSO construction which relies on broadcast encryption plus zero knowledge (ZK) proof [20] showing that the prover knows the corresponding private key of a given public key. So, implicitly each user is assumed to have been issued a public key in a public key infrastructure (PKI). In the setting of RSA cryptosystem, such a ZK proof is very inefficient due to the complexity of interactive communications between the prover (a user) and the verifier (a service provider). Therefore, compared with Han et al.'s generic scheme, the Chang-Lee scheme has several attracting features: less underlying primitives without using broadcast encryption, high efficiency without resort to ZK proof, and no requirement of PKI for users. Unfortunately, as we shall discuss later this efficient SSO scheme is not secure.

In this paper we show that the Chang-Lee scheme [19] is actually insecure by presenting two impersonation attacks, i.e., *credential recovering attack* and *impersonation attack without credentials*. In the first attack, a malicious service provider who has communicated with a legal user twice can successfully recover the user's credential. Then, the malicious service provider can impersonate the user to access resources and services provided by other service providers. The other attack may enable an outside attacker without any valid credential to impersonate a legal user or even a nonexistent user to have free access to the services. These two attacks imply that the Chang-Lee SSO scheme fails to meet credential privacy and soundness, which are essential requirements for SSO schemes and authentication protocols. We also identify the flaws in their security arguments in order to explain why it is possible to mount our attacks against their scheme. Similar attacks can also be applied to the Hsu-Chuang scheme [12], on which the Chang-Lee scheme is based. Finally, to avoid these two impersonation attacks we propose an improved SSO scheme to enhance the user authentication phase of the Chang-Lee scheme. To this end, we employ the efficient RSA-based verifiable encryption of signatures (VES) proposed by Ateniese [21] to verifiably and securely encrypt a user's credential. In fact, Ateniese's VES was originally introduced to realize fair exchange. There are no similar attacks in the setting of SSO and this is also the first time of using VES to design an SSO scheme, to the best of our knowledge.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews Chang-Lee scheme [19]. After that, we present two attacks against the Chang-Lee scheme in Section III, and briefly analyze Hsu-Chuang scheme [12] in Section IV. Then, the improved SSO scheme using VES is given in Section V. Finally, the conclusion is given in Section VI.

TABLE I
NOTATIONS

SCPC	The trusted authority
U_i, P_j	User and Service provider, respectively
ID_i, ID_j	The unique identity of U_i and P_j , respectively
e_X, d_X	The public/private RSA key pair of identity X
S_i	The credential of U_i created by SCPC
S_x	The long term private key of SCPC
S_y	The public key of SCPC
$E_K(M)$	A symmetric key encryption of plaintext M using a key K
$D_K(C)$	A symmetric key decryption of ciphertext C using a key K
$\sigma_j(SK_j, M)$	The signature σ_j on M signed by P_j with signing key SK_j
$Ver(PK_j, M, \sigma_j)$	Verifying signature σ_j on M with public key PK_j
$h(\cdot)$	A given one way hash function
\parallel	The operation of concatenation

II. REVIEW OF CHANG-LEE SCHEME

Chang and Lee's single sign-on scheme [19] is a remote user authentication scheme, supporting session key establishment and user anonymity. In their scheme, RSA cryptosystems are used to initialize a trusted authority, called an SCPC (smart card producing center), and service providers, denoted as P_j 's. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange technique is employed to establish session keys. In the Chang-Lee scheme, each user U_i applies a credential from the trusted authority SCPC, who signs an RSA signature for the user's hashed identity. After that, U_i uses a kind of knowledge proof to show that he/she is in possession of the valid credential without revealing his/her identity to eavesdroppers. Actually, this is the core idea of user authentication in their scheme and also the reason why their scheme fails to achieve secure authentication as we shall show shortly. On the other side, each P_j maintains its own RSA key pair for doing server authentication. The Chang-Lee's SSO scheme consists of three phases: system initialization, registration, and user identification. Table I explains notations, and the details of Chang-Lee scheme are reviewed as follows.

A. System Initialization Phase

The trusted authority SCPC first selects two large safe primes p and q , and then sets $N = pq$. After that, SCPC determines its RSA key pair (e, d) such that $ed = 1 \pmod{\phi(N)}$, where $\phi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$. SCPC chooses a generator $g \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$, where n is also a large prime number. Finally, SCPC publishes (e, g, n, N) , keeps d as a secret, and erases (p, q) immediately once this phase has been completed.

B. Registration Phase

In this phase, each user U_i chooses a unique identity ID_i with a fixed bit-length, and sends it to SCPC. After that, SCPC will return U_i the credential $S_i = (ID_i \parallel h(ID_i))^d \pmod{N}$, where \parallel denotes a concatenation of two binary strings and $h(\cdot)$ is a collision-resistant cryptographic one-way hash function. Here, both ID_i and S_i must be transferred via a secure channel.

At the same time, each service provider P_j with identity ID_j should maintain its own RSA public parameters (e_j, N_j) and private key d_j as does by SCPC.

C. User Identification Phase

To access the resources of service provider P_j , user U_i needs to go through the authentication protocol specified in Fig.1. Here, k and t are random integers chosen by P_j and U_i respectively; n_1, n_2 and n_3 are three random nonces; and $E(\cdot)$ denotes a symmetric key encryption scheme which is used to protect the confidentiality of user U_i 's identity ID_i . We highlight this phase as follows.

- Upon receiving a service request message m_1 from user U_i , service provider P_j generates and returns user message m_2 which is made up primarily by its RSA signature on (Z, ID_j, n_1) . Once this signature is validated, it means that user U_i has authenticated service provider P_j successfully. Here, $Z = g^k \bmod n$ is the temporal Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange material issued by P_j .
- After that, user U_i correspondingly generates his/her temporal DH key exchange material $w = g^t \bmod n$ and issues proof $x = S_i^{h(K_{ij}||w||n_2)}$, where $K_{ij} = h(ID_i||k_{ij})$ is the derived session key and $k_{ij} = Z^t \bmod n = w^k \bmod n = g^{kt} \bmod n$ is the raw key obtained by using the DH key exchange technique.
- Proof $x = S_i^{h(K_{ij}||w||n_2)}$ is used to convince P_j that U_i does hold valid credential S_i without revealing the value of S_i . Namely, after receiving message m_3 service provider P_j can confirm x 's validity by checking if $SID_i^{h(K_{ij}||w||n_2)} \bmod N = x^e \bmod N$, where $SID_i = (ID_i||h(ID_i))$. if this quality holds, it means that user U_i has been authenticated successfully by service provider P_j . It worth noting that proof x is designed in a particular way so that except P_j and U_i , no one else can verify it as both U_i 's identity ID_i and the newly established session key K_{ij} are used to produce x . This aims to achieve user anonymity as no eavesdropper can learn the values of ID_i and K_{ij} .
- Finally, message m_4 (i.e. $h(n_3)$) is employed to show that P_j has obtained message m_3 correctly, which implies the success of mutual authentication and session key establishment.

III. ATTACKS AGAINST THE CHANG-LEE SCHEME

As can be seen from the above. It seems that the Chang-Lee SSO scheme achieves secure mutual authentication since server authentication is done by using traditional RSA signature issued by service provider P_j and without valid credential S_i it looks impossible for an attacker to impersonate a legal user U_i by going through the user authentication procedure.

It can be seen from the following, however, that the Chang-Lee scheme is actually not a secure SSO scheme because there are two potential effective and concrete impersonation attacks. The first attack, the 'credential recovering attack' compromises the credential privacy in the Chang-Lee scheme as a malicious service provider is able to recover the credential of a legal




Fig. 1. User Identification Phase of Chang-Lee scheme

user. The other attack, an 'impersonation attack without credentials', demonstrates how an outside attacker may be able to freely make use of resources and services offered by service providers, since the attacker can successfully impersonate a legal user without holding a valid credential and thus violate the requirement of soundness for an SSO scheme. In real life, these attacks may put both users and service providers at high risk.

We now first describe our attacks together with the assumptions required, justify why these assumptions are reasonable, and finally discuss why the security analysis and proofs given in [19] are not enough to guarantee the security of the Chang-Lee SSO scheme.

A. Credential Recovering Attack

Intuitively, the Chang-Lee SSO scheme seems to satisfy the requirement of credential privacy since receiving credential proof $x = S_i^{h_2} \bmod N$, where h_2 denotes $h(K_{ij}||w||n_2)$, does not allow service provider P_j to recover user U_i 's credential S_i by computing $S_i = x^{h_2^{-1}} \bmod N$, where h_2^{-1} refers to $h_2^{-1} \bmod \phi(N)$. In fact, the difficulty of calculating h_2^{-1} from the given (e, N, x, h_2) is the exact rationale why the RSA cryptosystem is secure, i.e, it should be intractable for an attacker to derive the RSA private key from the public key (and a given ciphertext). This is because here we could treat (h_2, h_2^{-1}) as another RSA public/private key pair w.r.t the same RSA modulus N . Moreover, directly recovering S_i from $x = S_i^{h_2} \bmod N$ also looks impossible as this seems equivalent to decrypt the RSA ciphertext x w.r.t. the (ephemeral) public key h_2 .

Nevertheless, there is a pitfall in the production of proof $x = S_i^{h_2} \bmod N$ as here the same credential S_i is encrypted multiple times under different (ephemeral) public keys h_2 w.r.t. the same RSA modulus N . Consequently, under the assumption that malicious service provider P_j has run the Chang-Lee SSO scheme with the same user U_i twice, P_j will be able to recover U_i 's credential S_i with high probability by using the extended Euclidean algorithm. Namely, P_j can solve S_i from two equations $x = S_i^{h_2} \bmod N$ and $x' = S_i^{h'_2} \bmod N$. The details of the attack, which share some features of common-modulus attacks against RSA (Page 46 of [22]), are given as follows:

- 1) After successfully running Chang-Lee SSO scheme twice with the same user U_i , malicious service provider P_j stores all messages exchanged in these two instances, denoted as $(ID_i, x, K_{ij}, w, n_2, \dots)$ for the first instance, and $(ID_i, x', K'_{ij}, w', n'_2, \dots)$ for the second instance.
- 2) By denoting $h_2 = h(K_{ij} || w || n_2)$ and $h'_2 = h(K'_{ij} || w' || n'_2)$, P_j first checks if h_2 and h'_2 are co-prime, i.e. if $\gcd(h_2, h'_2) = 1$. In the case that $\gcd(h_2, h'_2) = 1$, P_j then runs the extended Euclidean algorithm (pages 290-292 of [22]) to compute two integers a and b such that $a \cdot h_2 + b \cdot h'_2 = 1$ (in \mathbb{Z}). Finally, malicious P_j can recover U_i 's credential S_i by computing

$$S_i = x^a \cdot x'^b \bmod N. \quad (1)$$

Eq. (1) is justified by the following equalities:

$$\begin{aligned} x^a \cdot x'^b \bmod N &= (S_i^{h_2})^a \cdot (S_i^{h'_2})^b \bmod N \\ &= S_i^{a \cdot h_2 + b \cdot h'_2} \bmod N \\ &= S_i^1 \bmod N \\ &= S_i. \end{aligned}$$

- 3) If $\gcd(h_2, h'_2) \neq 1$, P_j needs to run more instances with U_i so that it can get two instances such that $\gcd(h_2, h'_2) = 1$.

There are a number of comments to be made regarding the above attacks. First, it has a success rate of about 60% due for two reasons: (a) for two randomly selected integers u and v , the probability that $\gcd(u, v) = 1$ holds is $6/\pi^2 \approx 0.6$ [23][24]; and (b) as the outputs of hash function h , h_2 and h'_2 can be regarded as random numbers. This means that after executing the Chang-Lee SSO scheme with the same user U_i twice, malicious P_j will be able to recover U_i 's credential S_i with a probability of about 0.6. Consequently, it is easy to see that after running the scheme with U_i a couple of times, P_j can recover S_i almost certainly. Second, it is not hard to see that the above attack could be mounted by two or multiple malicious service providers who collude together once they put the values of h_2 together. Finally, the attack will lead to serious consequences since after recovering the valid credential of a legal user, malicious P_j can impersonate this user by running Chang-Lee SSO scheme in the same way as a legal user does to freely make use of the services offered by other service providers.

How could service provider P_j be malicious and then mount the above attack? On the one hand, the Chang-Lee SSO

scheme specifies that *SCPC* is the trusted party (refer to Section IV A [19]). So, this implies that service providers are not trusted parties and that they could be malicious. By agreeing with Yang *et al.* [10], when they said that “the Wu-Hsu’s modified version could not protect the user’s token against a malicious service provider, ...”, [19] also implicitly agrees that there is the potential for attacks from malicious service providers against SSO schemes. Moreover, if all service providers are assumed to be trusted, to identify him/herself user U_i can simply encrypt his/her credential S_i under the RSA public key of service provider P_i . Then, P_i can easily decrypt this ciphertext to get U_i 's credential and verify its validity by checking if it is a correct signature issued by *SCPC*. In fact, such a straightforward scheme with strong assumption is much simpler, more efficient and has better security, at least against this type of attack.

On the other hand, according to the security models given in [10] and [17], malicious service providers could be attackers in SSO schemes. In fact, this is a traditional as well as prudential way to deal with trustworthiness, since we cannot simply assume that beside the trusted authority *SCPC*, all service providers are also trusted. The basic reason is that assuming the existence of a trusted party is the strongest supposition in cryptography but it is usually very costly to develop and maintain. In particular, Han *et al.* [17] defined collusion impersonation attacks as a way to capture the scenarios in which malicious service providers may recover a user’s credential and then impersonate the user to login to other service providers. It is easy to see that the above credential recovery attack is simply a special case of collusion impersonation attack where a single malicious service provider can recover a user’s credential.

B. Impersonation Attack Without Credentials

We now study the soundness of the Chang-Lee SSO scheme, which seems to satisfy this security requirements as well. The main reason is that to get valid proof x satisfying $SID_i^{h_2} \bmod N = x^e \bmod N$ for a random hash output h_2 , there seems no other way but to compute x by $x = SID_i^{h_2 \cdot e^{-1}} \bmod N$, i.e., $x = (SID_i^d)^{h_2}$ or $x = (S_i)^{h_2} \bmod N$. Therefore, an attacker should not be able to log in to any service provider if it does not have the knowledge of either *SCPC*'s RSA private key d or user U_i 's credential S_i .

Again, however, such a plausible discussion simply explains the rationale of the Chang-Lee SSO scheme but cannot guarantee its security w.r.t. the soundness. This is also the essential reason why the current focus of research in information security is on formal proofs which rigorously show the security of cryptosystems. Indeed, no one can formally prove that without knowing either *SCPC*'s RSA private key d or user U_i 's credential S_i , it is unfeasible to compute a proof x that passes through authentication, as an outside attacker is able to get a shortcut if the *SCPC*'s RSA public key e is a small integer so that e 's binary length is less than the output length of hash function h , i.e., $|e| < |h(\cdot)|$. The attack is explained in detail as follows:

- 1) To impersonate legal user U_i with identity ID_i for

accessing service provider P_j , an attacker E first sends P_j request message m_1 normally, as U_i does.

- 2) Upon receiving message m_2 from P_j , E then checks P_j 's signature and chooses a random integer t to compute (k_{ij}, K_{ij}, w) . Before moving on to the next step, attacker E needs to check whether $h(K_{ij}||w||n_2)$ is divisible by e . If not, E has to choose another t or start a new session to satisfy this condition.
- 3) As $h(K_{ij}||w||n_2)$ is divisible by e , let $h(K_{ij}||w||n_2) = e \cdot b$ for some integer $b \in \mathbb{Z}$. Now, E sets $x = SID_i^b \bmod N$, where $SID_i = ID_i || h(ID_i)$
- 4) Finally, E can impersonate user U_i to pass the authentication by sending $m_3 = (w, x, y)$ to P_j , since P_j will notice that $SID_i^{h(K_{ij}||w||n_2)} \bmod N = x^e \bmod N$. This is because we have: $SID_i^{h(K_{ij}||w||n_2)} \bmod N = SID_i^{b \cdot e} \bmod N = x^e \bmod N$.

There are a number of things worth noting in regard to the above impersonation attack without credentials. First, the attack will succeed at a rate of about $1/e$ for one random number t in a new session. The reason is that $e|h(K_{ij}||w||n_2)$ holds with a probability of about $1/e$, since $|e| < |h(\cdot)|$ and the output of hash function h can be treated as random numbers. Consequently, if $e = 3$ the above attack can succeed once by trying about three values of t on average. Even if e is as large as $65537 (= 2^{16} + 1)$, trying 65537 times to get a successful impersonation may not be difficult for attacker E as it may explore a machine, which can be much more powerful than a mobile device, to do the computations needed for each try, i.e., two modular exponentiations and two hash evaluations. Moreover, even when timeout is introduced into the Chang-Lee scheme it may be not a real obstacle for attacker E as it can initialize new sessions (w.r.t. the same or different identities).

Second, in the above attack we assume that e is a small integer and attacker E may know the value of one legal user's identity ID_i . This is reasonable as explained below. On the one hand, in the system initialization phase (Section IV-A) the Chang-Lee scheme only specifies that the trusted party $SCPC$ needs to set its RSA key pair (e, d) but does not give any limitation on the length of public exponent e . So, e could be a small integer with binary length less than the output length of hash function h , i.e., $|e| < |h(\cdot)|$. Moreover, in practice this is likely to happen because: (a) to speed up the RSA signature verification, some security standards (e.g. PKCS #1 [25]), academic papers (e.g. [26]) and popular web sites (e.g. wikipedia [27]) suggest that e can be set as 3 or 65537; and (b) as the Chang-Lee scheme is claimed to be efficient even for mobile devices in distributed networks, using small exponent e can provide further computational advantage for these devices as they usually have limited resources for computation and storage [28]. In addition, the security analysis given in [19] neither excludes the case of small e nor relies on the concrete procedure of setting $SCPC$'s RSA key pair (e, d) .

On the other hand, in the Chang-Lee SSO scheme users' identities are not as crucial as their credentials, though the identities are transferred in ciphertext to provide user anonymity. So, users' identities could be known by an attacker due to reasons, such as users' negligence. At least

service providers know users' identities. Moreover, even if users' identities are well protected so that attacker E cannot impersonate registered user U_i as above, E can freely forge an identity ID . This is possible because in the Chang-Lee scheme, each user selects his/her identity by following only one requirement: each identity is a string with fixed bit-length. Therefore, even an outside attacker E can use an arbitrary such string as an identity to mount the above attack, since the service providers are not provided any additional mechanism to check whether identity ID has been registered with $SCPC$. This also implies that if e is a small integer, E can even impersonate a nonexistent user to make use of the resources and services offered by service providers.

Finally, it must be emphasized that impersonation attacks without valid credentials seriously violate the security of SSO schemes as it allows attacker to be successfully authenticated without first obtaining a valid credential from the trusted authority after registration. In other words, it means that in an SSO scheme suffering these attacks there are alternatives which enable passing through authentication without credentials.

C. Discussion

In [19], Chang and Lee provided a well-organized security analysis to show that their SSO scheme is secure. However, the two impersonation attacks presented in the previous section mean that their SSO scheme is actually not secure. So, why is their analysis not enough to guarantee the security of their scheme? What is the security flaw in their scheme leading to the above attacks? And what could we learn from these attacks to prevent similar situations in the future design of SSO schemes? These are the topics of this section.

In [19], the security of the Chang-Lee SSO scheme has been analyzed in three different ways: 1. BAN logic [29] was used to show the correctness of the Chang-Lee scheme; 2. Informal security arguments were given to demonstrate that their scheme can resist some attacks, including impersonation attacks. 3. A formal security proof was given to prove that their scheme is a secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol [30]. However, these security analyses and proofs still do not guarantee the full security of the Chang-Lee scheme and there are a number of reasons for this. First, as early as the 1990s it was known that although BAN logic had been shown useful to identify some attacks, it could approve protocols which are actually unsound in practice because of some technical weaknesses in the logic [31]. Moreover, in [19] the authors did not give details to show how the BAN logic can be used to prove that their scheme guarantees mutual authentication. In fact, at the end of section V-A of [19], the authors claimed to be able to: "prove that U_i and P_j are able to authenticate each other using our protocol." but they provided no argument to show why each party could not be impersonated by an attacker. Second, the authors did discuss informally why their scheme could withstand impersonation attacks by considering two scenarios, for example, an attacker re-uses previous nonce n_2 to forge message m_3 or selects random credential S_i to compute SID_i by $SID_i = S_i^e \bmod N$. However, such

informal arguments neither strongly confirm their scheme's security against these two concrete attacks nor exclude the existence of other scenarios of impersonation attacks, such as those presented in previous sections. Finally, their formal proof about AKE only focuses on the session key security, i.e., an attacker with all reasonable resources is not able to know the session key established between the two parties under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption (refer to Theorem 1 in [19], not the security of mutual authentication. According to the definitions given by Bellare and Rogaway [30], one fundamental requirement of a secure AKE protocol is that there be a secure mutual authentication in the first place.

From the above, we can see that it is the use of credential proof $x = S_i^{h_2} \bmod N$ which leads to the above two attacks against the Chang-Lee SSO scheme. More specifically, $x = S_i^{h_2} \bmod N$ is a kind of knowledge proof which shows that a prover (usually played by user U_i) knows credential S_i . However, this is not a secure proof as a malicious verifier (i.e. service provider P_j) can recover S_i and an outside attacker may be able to get authenticated without a credential. Based on this observation, a natural improvement on the Chang-Lee scheme would be to replace non-interactive proof x by a rigorous but interactive zero knowledge (ZK) proof [20] that shows the prover's knowledge of secret $S_i = SID_i^d \bmod N$ without revealing any additional information about credential S_i . In other words, using the verifiably encrypted signature introduced in [33], user U_i can encrypt his/her credential S_i under the public key of a trusted party and verifiably convince service provider P_j that the ciphertext does contain S_i w.r.t. U_i 's identity ID_i without allowing P_j to get any additional information about credential S_i . Compared with two modular exponentiations used for generating and verifying proof x , however, ZK proofs for showing the possession of an RSA signature usually require hundreds of modulo exponentiations [32], [33] since these proofs rely on inefficient "cut and choose" method, i.e., binary challenges.

From the two attacks presented above, we can learn that both credential privacy and soundness are crucial for SSO schemes. As mentioned in Section III-A, credential privacy has been studied in Yang et. al [10] and Han *et al.* [17]. To the best of our knowledge, however, there is surprisingly, no existing research which has given a careful treatment of soundness. For example, Han *et al.* [17] did not investigate soundness, though they did carefully study how to formally define credential forgery and recovery attacks from outsiders, users, service providers and their potential collusion. According to the most traditional form of authentication, a user will be authenticated if he/she can provide a valid pair of user name and password (i.e. credential), and soundness is obviously satisfied because a user is not able to go through authentication without providing a valid credential which is registered and maintained by a server. In complex scenarios, like the Chang-Lee scheme, the situation may be less obvious and, in fact, quite challenging. For this reason, the problem remains an open one for future study. The question of formally defining the soundness of SSO/authentication schemes and rigorously proving them for concrete solutions remains an interesting and important one.

Finally, it must be noted that the analysis above shows

only that the Chang-Lee SSO scheme fails to achieve secure authentication, without violating its security for achieving user anonymity and session key privacy.

IV. ATTACKS ON HSU-CHUANG SCHEME

In this section, we briefly highlight the difference between the Chang-Lee scheme [19] and the Hsu-Chuang scheme [12] to see why the above describe impersonation attacks apply to this latter as well. The two schemes have similar structures and use similar notations, but the technical details differ. In summary, the Hsu-Chuang scheme is differs from the Chang-Lee scheme in three ways. First, in the Hsu-Chuang scheme user U_i 's credential S_i is a naive RSA signature signed by the trusted party *SCPC*, i.e., $S_i = ID_i^d \bmod N$, where ID_i is U_i 's identity selected by him/herself. Second, to authenticate itself, service provider P_j sends signature $u = g_j^{h(Z||T_1||ID_j) \cdot d_j} \bmod N_j$, where Z is the DH key material generated by P_j , T_1 is the current timestamp, and ID_j is P_j 's identity. Finally, for user authentication user U_i issues and sends proof $x = S_i^{h(K_{ij}||Z||w||T_2)} \bmod N$ to P_j , who validates x by checking if $ID_i^{h(K_{ij}||Z||w||T_2)} = x^e \bmod N$. For more detail, see [12] or Section II of [19].

As pointed out in [19], the Hsu-Chuang scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attack as an attacker can forge a valid credential S_i w.r.t. identity ID_i by simply selecting random $S_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ and then computing $ID_i = S_i^e \bmod N$. This attack can be excluded if a specific encoding format is required for identities and the credential is issued by using a secure hash h , i.e., $S_i = h(ID_i)^d \bmod N$, as in the Chang-Lee scheme. According to the discussion in Section III, the Hsu-Chuang scheme is still not secure even with such a countermeasure. The reason is that our two attacks against the Chang-Lee scheme apply to the Hsu-Chuang scheme as well. This means that the Hsu-Chuang scheme also fails to satisfy both credential privacy and soundness of authentication. In addition, there is another flaw in the Hsu-Chuang scheme. Attacker E can impersonate service provider P_j to cheat legal users, as service authentication is conducted by using a non-traditional RSA signature, $u = g_j^{h(Z||T_1||ID_j) \cdot d_j} \bmod N_j$. By communicating with P_j twice attacker E can get messages (Z, T_1, ID_j, u) and (Z', T'_1, ID_j, u') satisfying $u = g_j^{h(Z||T_1||ID_j) \cdot d_j} \bmod N_j$ and $u' = g_j^{h(Z'||T'_1||ID_j) \cdot d_j} \bmod N_j$. Once $\gcd(h(Z||T_1||ID_j), h(Z'||T'_1||ID_j)) = 1$ (this holds with probability about 0.6, as we discussed in Section III-A), E can run the extended Euclidean algorithm (pages 290-292 of [22]) to find two integers a and b such that $a \cdot h(Z||T_1||ID_j) + b \cdot h(Z'||T'_1||ID_j) = 1$ in \mathbb{Z} (without knowing the factors of S_j 's RSA modulus). Hence, E can recover $g_j^{d_j} \bmod N_j$ by computing $g_j^{d_j} \bmod N_j = u^a u'^b \bmod N_j$. After that, E can impersonate P_j to any legal user by using the value of $g_j^{d_j} \bmod N_j$ to issue signature $u = (g_j^{d_j} \bmod N_j)^{h(Z||T_1||ID_j)}$, without knowing P_j 's RSA private key d_j .

V. PROPOSED IMPROVEMENT

To overcome the flaws in the Chang-Lee scheme [19], we now propose an improvement by employing an RSA-based

verifiable encryption of signatures (RSA-VES), which is an efficient primitive introduced in [21] for realising fair exchange of RSA signatures. VES comprises three parties: a trusted party and two users, say Alice and Bob. The basic idea of VES is that Alice who has a key pair of signature scheme signs a given message and encrypts the resulting signature under the trusted party's public key, and uses a noninteractive zero-knowledge (NZK) proof [35] to convince Bob that she has signed the message and the trusted party can recover the signature from the ciphertext. After validating the proof, Bob can send his signature for the same message to Alice. For the purpose of fair exchange, Alice should send her signature in plaintext back to Bob after accepting Bob's signature. If she refuses to do so, however, Bob can get her signature from the trusted party by providing Alice's encrypted signature and his own signature, so that the trusted party can recover Alice's signature and sends it to Bob, meanwhile, forwards Bob's signature to Alice. Thus, fair exchange is achieved.

The basic idea of the improved scheme can be highlighted as follows. User U_i 's credential is $S_i = h(ID_i)^{2d} \bmod N$, i.e., SCPC's RSA signature on the square of the hashed user identity (in contrast to $S_i = h(ID_i)^d \bmod N$ in [19]). For user authentication, U_i will encrypt his/her credential S_i using ElGamal encryption of SCPC's other public key $y = g^u$ by computing $P_1 = S_i \cdot y^r \bmod N$ and $P_2 = g^r \bmod N$, where $g \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ of big order and u is SCPC's secret decryption key. In this improvement, SCPC also plays the role of the trust authority in VES. To convince a service provider that (P_1, P_2) does encrypt his/her credential S_i (i.e. SCPC's RSA signature for ID_i), U_i must also provide an NZK proof x to show that he or she knows a secret r such that $\frac{P_1^e}{h(ID_i)^{2e}} = (y^e)^r \bmod N$ and $P_2 = g^r \bmod N$. Such a proof x , is called 'proving the equality of two discrete logarithms in a group of unknown order' [21], will convince the service provider without leaking any useful information about U_i 's credential S_i . For server authentication, service providers can simply issue signatures as did [19], though the proposed changes give service providers the freedom to employ any secure signature scheme. The other procedures are the same as in the Chang-Lee scheme.

A. Initialization Phase

SCPC selects two large safe primes p and q to set $N = pq$. Namely, there are two primes p' and q' such that $p = 2p' + 1$ and $q = 2q' + 1$. SCPC now sets its RSA public/private key pair (e, d) such that $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{2p'q'}$, where e is a prime. Let Q_N be the subgroup of squares in \mathbb{Z}_N^* whose order $\#G = p'q'$ is unknown to the public but its bit-length $l_G = |N| - 2$ is publicly known. SCPC randomly picks generator g of Q_N , selects an ElGamal decryption key u , and computes the corresponding public key $y = g^u \bmod N$. In addition, for completing the Diffie-Hellman key exchange SCPC chooses generator $\bar{g} \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$, where n is another large prime number. SCPC also chooses a cryptographic hash function $h(\cdot) : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$, where security parameter k satisfies $160 \leq k \leq |N| - 1$. Another security parameter $\epsilon > 1$ is chosen to control the tightness of the ZK proof [34]. Finally, SCPC publishes $(e, N, h(\cdot), \epsilon, g, y, \bar{g}, n)$, and keeps (d, u) secret.




Fig. 2. Our improved scheme

B. Registration Phase

In this phase, upon receiving a register request, SCPC gives U_i fixed-length unique identity ID_i and issues credential $S_i = h(ID_i)^{2d} \bmod N$. S_i calculated as SCPC's RSA signature on $h(ID_i)^2$ is an element of Q_N , which will be the main group we are calculating.

As in [19], each service provider P_j with identity ID_j should maintain a pair of signing/verifying keys for a secure signature scheme (not necessarily RSA). $\sigma_j(SK_j, Msg)$ denotes the signature σ_j on message Msg signed by P_j using signing key SK_j . $Ver(PK_j, Msg, \sigma_j)$ denotes verifying of signature σ_j with public key PK_j , which outputs "1" or "0" to indicating if the signature is valid or invalid, respectively.

C. Authentication Phase

In this phase, RSA-VES is employed to authenticate a user, while a normal signature is used for service provider authentication. The details are illustrated in Fig. 2 and further explained as follows:

- 1) U_i sends a service request with nonce n_1 to service provider P_j .
- 2) Upon receiving (Req, n_1) , P_j calculates its session key material $Z = g^k \bmod n$ where $k \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ is a random number, sets $u = Z \parallel ID_j \parallel n_1$, issues a signature $v = \sigma_j(SK_j, u)$, and then sends $m_2 = (Z, v, n_2)$ to the user, where n_2 is a nonce selected by P_j .

- 3) Upon receiving $m_2 = (Z, v, n_2)$, U_i sets $u = Z||ID_j||n_1$. U_i terminates the conversation if $Ver(PK_j, u, v) = 0$. Otherwise, U_i accepts service provider P_j because the signature v is valid. In this case, U_i selects a random number $t \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ to compute $w = g^t \bmod n$, $k_{ij} = Z^t \bmod n$, and the session key $K_{ij} = h(ID_j||k_{ij})$. For user authentication, U_i first encrypts his/her credential S_i as $(P_1 = S_i \cdot y^r \bmod N, P_2 = g^r \bmod N)$, where r is a random integer with binary length l_G . Next, U_i computes two commitments $a = (y^e)^{r_1} \bmod N$ and $b = g^{r_1} \bmod N$, where $r_1 \in \pm\{0, 1\}^{\epsilon(l_G+k)}$ is also a random number. After that, U_i computes the evidence showing that credential S_i has been encrypted in (P_1, P_2) under public key y . For this purpose, U_i calculates $c = h(K_{ij}||w||n_2||y^{er}||P_2||y^e||g||a||b)$ and $s = r_1 - c \cdot r$ (in \mathbb{Z}). Then, $x = (P_1, P_2, a, b, c, s)$ is the NIZK proof for user authentication. In fact, it is precisely, the processes of generating x which is the proof part of RSA-VES [21]. Finally, U_i encrypts his/her identity ID_i , new nonce n_3 , and P_j 's nonce n_2 using session key K_{ij} to get ciphertext $CT = E_{K_{ij}}(ID_i||n_3||n_2)$, and thereafter sends $m_3 = (w, x, CT)$ to service provider P_j .
- 4) To verify U_i , P_j calculates $k_{ij} = w^k \bmod n$, the session key $K_{ij} = h(ID_j||k_{ij})$, and then uses K_{ij} to decrypt CT and recover (ID_i, n_3, n_2) . Then, P_j computes $y^{er} = P_1^e/h(ID_i)^2 \bmod N$, $a = (y^e)^s \cdot (y^{er})^c \bmod N$, $b = g^s \cdot P_2^c \bmod N$, and checks if $(c, s) \in \{0, 1\}^k \times \pm\{0, 1\}^{\epsilon(l_G+k)+1}$ and $c = h(K_{ij}||w||n_2||y^{er}||P_2||y^e||g||a||b)$. If the output is negative, P_j aborts the conversation. Otherwise, P_j accepts U_i and believes that they have shared the same session key K_{ij} by sending U_i $m_4 = (V)$ where $V = h(n_3)$.
- 5) After U_i receives V , he checks if $V = h(n_3)$. If this is true, then U_i believes that they have shared the same session key K_{ij} . Otherwise, U_i terminates the conversation.

D. Security Analysis

We now analyze the security of the improved SSO scheme by focusing on the security of the user authentication part, especially soundness and credential privacy due to two reasons. On the one hand, the unforgeability of the credential is guaranteed by the unforgeability of RSA signatures, and the security of service provider authentication is ensured by the unforgeability of the secure signature scheme chosen by each service provider. On the other hand, other security properties (e.g., user anonymity and session key privacy) are preserved, since these properties have been formally proved in [19] and the corresponding parts of the Chang-Lee scheme are kept unchanged.

Soundness requires that without holding valid credential S^* corresponding to a target user U^* , an attacker, who could be a collusion of users and service providers, has at most a negligible probability of generating proof x^* and going through user authentication by impersonating user U^* . The soundness

of the above improved SSO scheme relies on the soundness of the NIZK proof, which also guarantees the soundness of RSA-VES, defined as the second property of Definition 1 in [21]. Namely, if the user authentication part is not sound, i.e., an attacker can present valid proof x^* without holding the corresponding credential S^* in non-negligible probability, then this implies the NIZK proof of proving equality of two discrete logarithms in a group of unknown order is not sound, contradictory to the analysis given in Section 3.7 of [21].

Credential privacy or credential irrecoverableness requires that there be a negligible probability of an attacker recovering a valid credential from the interactions with a user. Again this property can be deduced from the signature hiding property of RSA-VES, defined as the third property of Definition 1 in [21]. Signature hiding means that an attacker cannot extract a signature from VES without help from the user who encrypted the signature or the trusted authority who can decrypt a VES. So, if this improved SSO scheme fails to meet credential privacy, it implies that Ateniese's RSA-VES fails to satisfy signature hiding, which is contrary to the analysis given in Section 3.7 of [21]. In fact, soundness and signature hiding are the two core security properties to guarantee the fairness of digital signature exchange using VES.

More rigorous security proofs are interesting topics for further study by considering formal definitions first.

VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we demonstrated two effective impersonation attacks on Chang and Lee's single sign-on (SSO) scheme [19]. The first attack shows that their scheme cannot protect the privacy of a user's credential, and thus, a malicious service provider can impersonate a legal user in order to enjoy the resources and services from other service providers. The second attack violates the soundness of authentication by giving an outside attacker without credential the chance to impersonate even a non-existent user and then freely access resources and services provided by service providers. We also discussed why their well-organized security arguments are not strong enough to guarantee the security of their SSO scheme. In addition, we explained why Hsu and Chuang's scheme [12] is also vulnerable to these attacks. Furthermore, by employing an efficient verifiable encryption of RSA signatures introduced by Ateniese [21], we proposed an improved Chang-Lee scheme to achieve soundness and credential privacy. As future work, it is interesting to formally define authentication soundness and construct efficient and provably secure single sign-on schemes. Based on the draft of this work [36], a preliminary formal model addressing the soundness of SSO has been proposed in [37]. Further research is necessary to investigate the maturity of this model and study how the security of the improved SSO scheme proposed in this paper can be formally proven.

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